The UAE's dangerous Extremism Law

Abstract

Across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), vague and overbroad definitions of “terrorism”, “terrorist organisation” and “violent extremism” have enabled states to systematically criminalise peaceful dissent, silence human rights defenders, and restrict civic space. The absence of precise, rights-compliant definitions creates wide room for abuse, allowing authorities to prosecute forms of expression, association, and assembly that are protected under international human rights law.

In this context, MENA Rights Group’s submission to the Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights focuses on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the human rights concerns raised by the country’s approach to the concept of “extremism” — both at the international level, through its co-sponsorship of ambiguous United Nations (UN) Security Council language, and at the domestic level, through the enactment of a broad and concerning law. 

“Extremism” in the UAE

The international dimension: UN Security Council Resolution 2686

In June 2023, while presiding over the UN Security Council, the UAE co-sponsored, together with the United Kingdom (UK), the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2686 on “Human Fraternity”. The resolution has been criticised for containing ambiguous references to fighting “extremism”  – appearing in the Preamble and in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 7, and 11 – without ever defining the term, or even the common reference to “violent” extremism. The failure to define this concept at the international level set a troubling precedent, potentially lending legitimacy to expansive domestic interpretations of the notion.

The domestic dimension: Federal Law by Decree No. 34 of 2023

At the domestic level, in October 2023, the UAE government enacted Federal Law by Decree No. 34 of 2023 on Combating Discrimination, Hatred, and Extremism (hereinafter: “Extremism Law”), repealing and replacing Federal Decree Law No. 2 of 2015 on Combating Discrimination and Hatred.

A dangerously broad definition of “extremism”

Article 1 of the Extremism Law defines “extremism” as “any action carried out by one or more people or groups motivated by ideas, ideologies, values, or principles that would disrupt public order, or would express blasphemy, discriminate, or incite hate speech.”  By relying on broad, undefined notions such as “disrupting public order”, the definition is susceptible to broad interpretation at the discretion of the authorities and risks criminalising forms of expression protected under international human rights law. Article 3 compounds this concern by providing that “freedom of opinion and expression may not be invoked to commit any statement or action that would incite blasphemy or harm them.”

This definition does not emerge in a vacuum. It replicates the same structural flaws found in the UAE’s broader security and counter-terrorism legislative framework, which has long been criticised by UN human rights experts and civil society for its vagueness and its abuse by the UAE authorities to crackdown on peaceful dissidents. The UAE’s 2014 Law on Combating Terrorism Offences (hereinafter: “Counter-Terrorism Law”) fails to define terrorism directly, instead referring to undefined notions of “terrorist purpose” and “terrorist result”, the latter encompassing acts as broad as “opposing the country” or “influencing public authorities”. UN experts found these definitions to be circular and undefined, expressed concern that their ambiguity could allow forms of criticism or dissent to be interpreted and prosecuted as terrorism, seemingly at the subjective discretion of the relevant authorities. 

Similarly, the Federal Law by Decree No. 31 of 2021 Promulgating the Crimes and Penalties Law (hereinafter: “Penal Code”), imposes the death penalty or life imprisonment on anyone who joins any group “aiming or seeking or working to prejudice the safety or interests of the State”, or who merely cooperates with or supports such a group. The Federal Decree-Law No. No. 34 of 2021 On Countering Rumours and Cybercrimes (hereinafter: “Cybercrime Law”) criminalises online content that would “decrease the public’s confidence in any of the government authorities’ performance” or “harm the public order”. 

Severe criminal penalties

The UAE’s Extremism Law imposes harsh criminal penalties for conduct falling within its broad scope. Article 7 provides for a minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment for any “act that would incite hate speech by any means of expression”. Article 13 prescribes a minimum of ten years of imprisonment for anyone who establishes, organises, or manages any group for purposes related to “blasphemy, discrimination, or provoking, encouraging or promoting hate speech”, while article 14 punishes anyone who merely joins or assists such a group with up to seven years of imprisonment.

Such severe penalties, attached to broadly defined offences, mirror the heavy sentences already available under articles 14 and 15 of the Counter-Terrorism Law, which provide for capital punishment or life imprisonment for actions “intended for threatening the State’s stability, safety, unity, sovereignty or security” or that “contradict the basic principles underlying the governance system of the State”, and for imprisonment for anyone who “declares, by any means of communication, his opposition to the State, or to the ruling system therein or his non-allegiance to its leadership”.

Preventive detention based on “risk of extremism”

Of particular concern are articles 18 and 19 of the Extremism Law, which introduce a regime of preventive measures targeting individuals deemed to present a “risk of extremism”. 

Article 18(1) establishes that “the risk of extremism exists in a person who commits any of the crimes stipulated in this Decree by Law if he adopts extremist ideology such that he fears that he will commit another crime”. This provision closely mirrors article 40 of the Counter-Terrorism Law, which provides that a person “shall be deemed as posing terrorist threat if said person adopts the extremist or terrorist ideology to the extent that he/she seems likely to commit a terrorist offence”. UN Special Procedures have already criticised that provision, noting that the law “remains silent with regard to the threshold at which a person will be deemed ‘likely’ to commit a terrorism offense, nor is it clear how ‘likelihood’ of offending is to be assessed”, and warning that it “seems to grant broad discretionary powers to judicial authorities to detain individuals on vague grounds, without officially imposing a prison sentence on them, thereby seemingly undermining the principle of legal certainty and other fundamental legal safeguards, and may constitute pre-emptive arbitrary deprivation of liberty”. The Extremism Law thereby reproduces this same flawed standard, extending it from the counter-terrorism domain into the broader and even more loosely defined realm of “extremism”.

Article 18(2) provides that a person assessed as presenting a risk of extremism “may be placed in one of the Counselling Centres, by ruling from the Court and upon a request from the Public Prosecution Office”. The Counselling Centres refer to the so-called “rehabilitation” or Munasaha Centres,  established under the Counter-Terrorism Law and the Decree Law No. 28 of 2019 on the establishment of the National Counselling Centre (hereinafter: the Munasaha Law), regarding which MENA Rights Group has documented serious concerns. Defined in the counter-terrorism law as “administrative units aiming at the enlightenment and reform of persons deemed to pose terrorist threat or those convicted of terrorist offences”, Munasaha Centres have in practice been used to indefinitely detain critics and activists, including individuals who had already completed prison sentences handed down for the exercise of their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The Munasaha Law further extended their mandate to encompass the detention of holders of “deviant ideology”, defined simply as “beliefs not aligned with the values, principles, or orientation of society” — a formulation that could arbitrarily apply to any dissenting viewpoint. UN experts have expressed deep concern about the practices of extended administrative detention in Munasaha Centres, the serious risks of arbitrary detention they pose, and the possible violations of the absolute right to freedom of opinion. In a 2023 Opinion on the detention of 12 individuals held in Munasaha Centres, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) found that their continued detention after completion of their sentences was “retaliatory in nature, directed against those who dare to criticise the Government”, and that they had been “arbitrarily deprived of their liberty on discriminatory grounds, owing to their status as human rights defenders and on the basis of their political or other opinion.” 

Article 18(3) further provides that the Counselling Centre shall submit periodic reports every three months to the Public Prosecution Office, which in turn submits them to the Court. The Court may order the release of a person only if “it becomes clear to it that his condition allows that”. The absence of a defined maximum duration, combined with this discretionary release standard, raises serious fears of indefinite detention, mirroring the concerns raised in the context of the Munasaha Centres.

Broad administrative measures and an extremism listing regime

Article 19(1) of the Extremism Law empowers the Court, upon request by the Public Prosecution Office, to impose on any person deemed to present a “risk of extremism” one or more of the following measures for a judicially determined period: a travel ban; surveillance; prohibition of residing in a specific place or area; determination of a required place of residence; prohibition of visiting certain places; or prevention of contact with specific persons. MENA Rights Group fears that this provision risks generating the kind of arbitrary administrative measures that have been subject of serious human rights concerns by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The vague reference to “one or more measures” may also encompass citizenship stripping, a practice which has impacted a number of Emirati political dissidents and their families and garnered criticism from UN human rights experts. These measures closely parallel those already available under the counter-terrorism law’s terrorism listing regime, including asset freezes and penalties up to life imprisonment for family members who maintain communication with listed individuals.

Article 20 further introduces a dedicated extremism listing regime, under which the Cabinet may establish lists of extremist organisations or persons. While, unlike the terrorism listing regime under the Counter-Terrorism law, the Extremism Law provides for a right of appeal against listing decisions, the Cabinet retains full discretion over the rules governing inclusion, deletion and re-listing, and the legal effects of listing are left to be determined by future Cabinet resolution, leaving their scope undefined. 

Jurisdiction over extremism-related crimes and preventive measures is reserved under article 23(2) to Federal Courts, which raises concerns about judicial independence given the broader structural subordination of the judiciary to the executive in the UAE. Article 21 further empowers courts to order the dissolution of organisations, confiscation of funds and assets, and deportation of convicted foreign nationals as ancillary penalties, measures that, when combined with the law’s broad offence definitions, could be deployed against peaceful activity protected under international human rights law.

Conclusion

In conclusion, and in light of the above-mentioned considerations, UAE authorities should:

• Repeal or fundamentally amend the 2023 Extremism Law to bring it into conformity with international human rights standards, and in particular with regard to the definition of “extremism” and compliance with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality;
• Repeal or amend the preventive detention provisions of the 2023 Law, and to cease using Munasaha or Counselling Centres as tools of indefinite administrative detention, in line with the concerns raised by UN experts;
• Repeal the extremism listing regime introduced by article 20 of the 2023 Law, or amend it to ensure it is governed by clear, transparent and rights-compliant rules, and that any listing decision is subject to meaningful judicial oversight and appeal before an independent court;
• Cease using counter-terrorism and extremism laws and measures to target peaceful dissidents, human rights defenders, and their families, to release all those arbitrarily detained under such laws, and to provide reparations to those whose rights have been violated;
• Repeal or fundamentally amend the 2014 Counter-Terrorism Law, the Penal Code, and the 2021 Cybercrime Law, all of which contain vague and overbroad provisions enabling the criminalisation of peaceful dissent, and to align their counter-terrorism and security legislation as a whole with international human rights standards.